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Intrafirm Trade and Product Contractibility
By Andrew B. Bernard, J. Bradford Jensen, Stephen J. Redding,
and Peter K. Schott*
Forty-six percent of US imports occur
between related parties. This aggregate statistic, however, obscures considerable variation
in intrafirm intensity across import partners as
well as products. Indeed, while 74 percent of US
imports from Japan are intrafirm, the figure for
Bangladesh is just two percent. Likewise, trade
between related parties accounted for two percent of US imports of rubber and plastic footwear, but more than 70 percent of US imports
of autos, medical equipment, and instruments.
There is also significant variation in intrafirm
intensity across countries within products. Photo
Films, Plates and Chemicals (North American
Industry Classification System 325992), for
example, ranks fifth overall in terms of the
share of intrafirm trade, but half of the countries
from which it is sourced (by value) exported it
to the United States almost completely at arm’s
length.1

These figures highlight the importance of
product and country characteristics—and
especially their interaction—in explaining
intrafirm trade. Such factors are emphasized in
recent theoretical models of multinational firms
that stress the role of contracting in firms’ decisions both to source components in-house versus
at arm’s length and to locate production at home
versus abroad.2 These models differ from earlier
theories of multinationals in their emphasis on
the costs associated with writing contracts for
specialized inputs and the attention they pay to
traded intermediate goods.
Guided by these models, we examine the
product and country determinants of intrafirm
trade.3 In particular, we introduce a new measure of products’ revealed contractibility based
on the idea that contracting likely is easier for
products passing through intermediaries such as
wholesalers. We find that both this measure and
countries’ governance quality are associated
with variation in intrafirm trade in interesting
and intuitive ways, and that factors associated
with engaging in related-party trade differ from
those associated with the intensity of intrafirm
trade once a link is established. Higher quality country governance, for example, is associated with a higher probability of related-party
trade taking place. Further increases in quality,
however, coincide with lower shares of relatedparty trade, presumably due to the greater ease
with which arm’s length contracts can be written. With respect to interactions of product and
country attributes, improvements in country
governance lead to the largest reductions in
intrafirm trade in low contractibility products.

* Bernard: Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth
and NBER, 100 Tuck Hall, Hanover, NH 03755 (e-mail:
andrew.b.bernard@tuck.dartmouth.edu); Jensen: George
town University and NBER, 521 Hariri, McDonough School
of Business, Washington, D.C. 20057 (e-mail: jbj24@
georgetown.edu); Redding: London School of Economics
and CEPR, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE UK
(e-mail: s.j.redding@lse.ac.uk); Schott: Yale School of
Management and NBER, 135 Prospect Street, New Haven,
CT 06520 (e-mail: peter.schott@yale.edu). We thank Evan
Gill, Justin Pierce, and Jose Daniel Reyes for excellent
research assistance, and the National Science Foundation
for research support. Bernard thanks the European
University Institute, and Redding thanks the ESRC-funded
Centre for Economic Performance for research support.
We thank Pol Antràs, Keith Head, Nathan Nunn, Emanuel
Ornelas and seminar participants at the NBER and Paris
for helpful comments. Empirical analysis was conducted at
Census Research Data Centers. Any opinions, findings, and
conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and not necessarily those of
the NSF, the NBER or the US Census Bureau. Results have
been screened to insure no confidential data are revealed.
1
A longer version of this paper, Bernard, Jensen,
Redding, and Schott (forthcoming), contains additional
results and is available on the AER Web site (http://www.
aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.99.2.487)
and
from the authors.

See, for example, Pol Antràs (2003), Antràs and
Elhanan Helpman (2004), and Gene M. Grossman and
Helpman (2005).
3
Our findings complement existing empirical examinations of intrafirm trade by Gregory Corcos, Delphine
Irac, Giordano Mion, and Thierry Verdier (2008), Fabrice
Defever and Farid Toubal (2007), Nathan Nunn and Daniel
Trefler (2008) and Stephen R. Yeaple (2006).
2
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I. Data

We use the US Linked/Longitudinal Firm
Trade Transaction Database (LFTTD), which
links individual US trade transactions to US
firms.4 Import transactions take place between
related parties if either party owns, directly or
indirectly, six percent or more of the other party.
To align Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)
production and HS trade data, and to expand the
sample of countries on which data on country
characteristics are available, we focus on the
year 1997.
To explore the role of various country characteristics discussed below, we combine these
trade data with measures of physical capital
abundance, human capital abundance, and
population from Robert E. Hall and Charles I.
Jones (1999), a composite index of countries’
governance quality from the World Bank, and
measures of trade and foreign direct investment
(FDI) protection from Heritage Foundation/
WSJ (2006).5 We measure products’ capital
and skill intensity using data from the 1997 US
Census of Manufactures. We assign all ten-digit
HS products within a particular four-digit SIC
industry the average capital or skill (nonproduction workers as a share of employment) intensity
of all plants whose output is concentrated in that
industry. Industry headquarters intensity is measured by the average share of firm employment
at headquarters and auxiliary establishments.6
We assume that products passing through
intermediaries are the easiest over which to contract. As a result, we measure products’ revealed
contractibility as the weighted average wholesale employment share of firms importing the
product, using firms’ import value as weights,
(1)

Wf Mpf
IMEDp = ∑   _____   ___ .
EMP
f Mp
f

4
See Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2009) for more
details.
5
We use factor analysis to create a univariate measure
of country governance for 1996 from the six World Bank
measures reported by Daniel Kaufman, Aart Kraay, and
Massimo Mastruzzi (2006). The first factor upon which we
focus accounts for around 90 percent of the variance of the
six measures.
6
For further discussion of the data definitions and
sources, see Bernard et al. (2010).
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The first term in the intermediation measure
is the share of wholesale employment (Wf )
in firm f  ’s total employment (EMPf ).7 The
second term is the import share of firm f in
ten-digit HS product market p, with Mpf and
Mp representing firm f  ’s imports of product
p and total US imports of product p, respectively. Intermediation ranges between zero and
unity: if no firms importing product p have
any wholesale establishments, IMEDp = 0. On
the other hand, if product p is imported exclusively by firms with 100 percent employment in
wholesaling, IMEDp = 1.
Intermediation and intrafirm import shares
are inversely related across two-digit HS categories, as shown in Figure 1. There is, however, substantial independent variation in the
two variables, as industries with similar levels of intermediation span a wide range of
intrafirm intensity. Footwear (HS 64) and
Organic Chemicals (HS 29), for example, have
comparable levels of intermediation, 0.135 and
0.136 respectively. However, more than half of
Organic Chemicals imports are conducted by
related parties, while the intrafirm trade share
for Footwear is less than ten percent.
II. Determinants of Intrafirm Trade

Our empirical analysis uses cross-sectional
data on intrafirm and total US imports of product p from country c in 1997. Our empirical
specification regresses measures of intrafirm
trade (IFpc ) on product characteristics (Xp ),
country characteristics (Zc ), and interactions
between product and country characteristics
(Xp × Zc ):
(2)

IFpc = θ + αXp + βZc + γ (Xp Zc) + ϵpc .

We consider two measures of intrafirm trade:
the share of intrafirm imports in US imports,
which we refer to as the “intensive” margin,
and a dummy variable which is equal to one if
there are positive intrafirm imports for a product and country, which we call the “extensive”
7
We observe employment and major industry at the
establishment level. We assign all employees in an establishment to the major industry of that establishment. Firms
with a single establishment necessarily have 100 percent
employment in a single industry. Wholesale is NAICS sector 42.
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Figure 1. Intrafirm Import Intensity and “Revealed
Contractibility” by Two-Digit HS Category, 1997

margin. In constructing the interaction terms,
we subtract the sample mean from each variable entering the interaction term. This normalization ensures that the main effects of each
variable can be interpreted as the effect at the
sample mean.
Our choice of product and country characteristics is motivated by the recent theoretical
literature on contractual frictions and international trade. This literature emphasizes the
relative importance of relationship specific
investments by headquarters and supplier
firms and the degree of contractibility of these
investments. In Antràs (2003), capital intensity captures the relative importance of headquarters’ investments, and hence we include
industry capital intensity and country capital
abundance. To allow for the possibility that
other factor intensities matter, we also include
industry skill intensity and country skill abundance. In Antràs and Helpman (2004), headquarters investments are interpreted more
broadly, and hence we include our direct measure of headquarters intensity discussed above.
In Grossman and Helpman (2005), the degree
of contractibility of relationship specific investments can vary with, for example, product and
country characteristics, and hence we include
revealed product contractibility and country
governance as further independent variables.
Finally, we explore the impact of policy based
barriers by including measures of trade and
FDI protection as country characteristics.
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Table 1 reports the results of estimating specification (2). Columns 1 and 3 use the
extensive margin as the dependent variable, so
the sample comprises all product-country cells
with positive imports, including those with zero
intrafirm trade. Columns 2 and 4 focus on the
intensive margin, and the sample is all observations with positive intrafirm trade. Columns
3 and 4 control for the nonrandom selection of
observations with positive intrafirm imports
using the Heckman two-stage estimation procedure. The two stages are separately identified by
functional form and the excluded variable from
the second-stage regression. For the excluded
variable, we choose the cost of phone calls to
the United States, which arguably affects the
fixed costs of establishing an affiliate but not the
relative variable costs of intrafirm versus arm’s
length trade.8
Consistent with the recent theoretical literature
on contractual frictions in international trade,
we find in columns 1 and 2 that higher revealed
product contractibility is associated with less
intrafirm trade on both the extensive and intensive margins. We also find that the sign on the
quality of country governance changes between
columns 1 and 2. Increases in governance quality raise the probability that foreign affiliates are
present (column 1) but are associated with lower
shares of intrafirm trade conditional on positive
intrafirm trade occurring (column 2). This result
suggests good governance promotes the establishment of related-party trade but not its intensity once established, which is consistent with
the idea that arm’s length contracting is easier
in countries with good governance. Similar
nonlinearities are present for population and
FDI protection.
Results in Table 1 also indicate the relevance
of interactions of product and country characteristics in determining intrafirm trade. While
the main effects for intermediation and country governance are both negative in column 4,
the interaction term has a positive coefficient.
That is, higher product intermediation (revealed
contractibility) is associated with greater reductions in intrafirm trade as governance quality
declines. Likewise, improved governance is
8
The likelihood ratio test of rho = 0 yields a chisquared statistic of 26.21, rejecting the null of independent
equations.
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Table 1—Determinants of Intra-Firm Imports, HS10-Country, 1997
Intra-firm
trade dummy
(1)

Share of intrafirm trade
(2)

Inverse Mills ratio

—

—

Sample

Full
Probit

Positive intrafirm trade
OLS

180,774

0.079
92,656

Intermediation
Governance
× Intermediation
Capital intensity
Log capital abundance
× Capital intensity
Skill intensity
Log human capital
abundance

× Skill intensity

HQ intensity
Log population
FDI protection
Trade protection
US phone call cost

Estimation
R2
Observations

−0.715***
(0.050)
0.154***
(0.014)
−0.058
(0.039)
−0.005
(0.021)
0.213***
(0.016)
0.068***
(0.016)
1.336***
(0.192)
−0.105**
(0.044)
−0.415
(0.407)
−0.103
(0.196)
0.152***
(0.008)
0.13***
(0.015)
−0.098***
(0.011)
—

−0.165***
(0.019)
−0.031***
(0.007)
0.084***
(0.015)
0.059***
(0.007)
0.067***
(0.006)
0.005
(0.004)
0.196***
(0.051)
−0.066***
(0.022)
−1.063***
(0.152)
0.043
(0.065)
−0.034***
(0.002)
−0.017***
(0.005)
0.017***
(0.004)
—

Intra-firm
trade dummy
(3)
−0.719***
(0.050)
0.103***
(0.019)
−0.056
(0.039)
−0.005
(0.020)
0.173***
(0.017)
0.072***
(0.015)
1.348***
(0.192)
−0.044
(0.046)
−0.460
(0.411)
−0.099
(0.196)
0.145***
(0.009)
0.154***
(0.014)
−0.092***
(0.011)
−0.050***
(0.003)

Share of intrafirm trade
(4)
−0.235***
(0.025)
−0.031***
(0.009)
0.090 ***
(0.017)
0.056 ***
(0.008)
0.068***
(0.007)
0.010**
(0.005)
0.324***
(0.067)
−0.059**
(0.023)
−1.142***
(0.174)
0.016
(0.071)
−0.033***
(0.003)
0.039***
(0.007)
−0.023***
(0.005)

Heckman
first-stage

0.150***
(0.029)
Positive intrafirm trade
Heckman
second-stage

180,774

92,656

Full

Note: In constructing the interaction terms, we subtract the sample mean from each variable
entering the interaction term, so that the main effects of each variable can be interpreted as
the effect at the sample mean. Columns 1 and 3 include all country-product pairs with positive
imports. Columns 2 and 4 include country-product pairs with positive intrafirm trade. Robust
standard errors adjusted for clustering at the four-digit SIC level are reported below coefficient
estimates.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
   * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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associated with less intrafirm trade, especially
for goods with lower intermediation.9
As in Antràs (2003), industry capital intensity and country capital abundance play a role
in determining the share of intrafirm trade. The
positive coefficient on the interaction between
industry capital intensity and country capital
abundance implies that intrafirm trade shares are
high for capital intensive products coming from
capital abundant countries. In contrast to previous work, we also find a role for industry skill
intensity and country skill abundance. The main
effects of industry skill intensity on intrafirm
trade are positive for both the intensive and extensive margins; the main effects of country human
capital abundance are negative; and the estimated
coefficients on the skill interaction terms are negative. Therefore, greater industry skill intensity
increases the share of intrafirm trade and leads to
larger increases in more skill scarce countries. In
contrast, greater country skill abundance reduces
the share of intrafirm trade, and leads to larger
reductions in more skill intensive products.
III. Conclusions

The literature on firms and international trade
has focused attention on issues of contracting
and the boundaries of the firm. This research
speaks to policy issues surrounding the growth
of outsourcing, offshoring and international
production networks.
Our results provide evidence on the role of
country governance and product contractibility
in determining intrafirm trade. We find evidence
of selection: the decision to establish a foreign
affiliate in a country differs from the choice of
how much to source from the affiliate once it is
established. While affiliates are more likely to
be situated in countries that are larger and have
better governance, once affiliates exist, the share
of intrafirm trade is negatively related to both
country size and country governance quality. Our
results also highlight interactions between country
and product characteristics—e.g., improvements
in country governance matter most for products
for which contracting is relatively difficult.

9
Bernard et al. (forthcoming) reports a wide range of
robustness tests.
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